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Abstract
Climate change is widely expected to increase weather related damage and the insurance claims
that result from it. This will increase insurance premiums in a way that is independent of a
customer’s contribution to the causes of climate change. Insurance provides a financial mechanism
that mitigates some of the consequences of climate change, allowing damage from increasingly large
or frequent events to be repaired. We observe that the insurance industry could offset any increases
in premiums due to climate change through a levy on insurance premiums for fossil-fuel producers
for example, without needing government intervention or a new tax. We argue that an insurance-
led levy or government-led carbon tax must acknowledge a modern industry’s present carbon
emissions and its fossil-fuel heritage (its “carbon inheritance”), that is, it should recognise that
fossil-fuel driven industrial growth has provided the innovations and conditions needed for them
to exist and develop. These industries have inherited the benefits of past emissions, and we argue
that they should also inherit some of the cost of those past emissions, as manifested through any
statistical increase in weather-related damage due to climate change. A carbon-intensity weighted
tax or levy on energy production is one mechanism that would recognise a modern industry’s carbon
inheritance, through increased energy costs of manufacturing and technology. It can be weighted to
encourage the least polluting industries, and to discourage unnecessarily carbon-intense industries.
The cost increases would initially be small, and will require an event attribution methodology to
determine their size. A tax or levy can be phased in as the science of event attribution becomes
sufficiently robust for each claim type, with the latter avoiding the need for government-led taxes,
agreements, and intervention, through a global insurance-led response to climate change.
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The insurance industry is a multi-trillion dollar business with a 2012 world premium
volume of $4 trillion US dollars [1], roughly 5-6% of world GDP (that was $71 trillion in 2012
[2]), with $24 trillion of global assets under management [1]. For the payment of an insurance
premium, consumers and businesses are protected from the cost of rare and unpredictable
events that they may not otherwise be able to afford. In this respect insurance provides
a useful social function [3]. Climate change is widely expected to increase the frequency
and size of insurance claims above that due to economic growth [4, 5]. Increased insurance
premiums will be required to meet any increased claim costs due to climate change, making
insurance less affordable, especially for the poorest and often most vulnerable people in
developing countries [5, 6]. This is unfortunate, because insurance provides a re-distributive
financial protection against erratic climate events, helping to offset some of the consequences
of climate change.
The primary anthropogenic contribution to climate change is from cumulative CO2 emis-
sions [6], but insurance costs do not reflect a consumer’s individual contribution to them.
For example, a developing country’s emissions per capita are a small fraction of those in
developed countries such as those in Europe [7]. Arguably it would be fairer if the climate
change related increases to insurance costs were paid for by the polluter, either directly or
indirectly through a carbon tax for example [8, 9]. In 2015 six European Union oil and gas
companies engaged with the United Nations to develop such a tax [10]. However, the insur-
ance industry is in an almost unique position of being able to reclaim these costs directly
itself through increased insurance costs on e.g. fossil-fuel producing industries. This would
require a degree of co-operation with appropriate fiscal oversight and agreement between
insurance companies to start such a scheme, but there is a clear incentive to do so, and a
strong scientific and ethical case to support it.
The insurance industry is well organised, with international organisations such as the
Global Federation of Insurance Associations (GFIA), the Association of British Insurers
(ABI), and The Geneva Association. It has already demonstrated a willingness to take the
lead in tackling climate risk, with 66 CEOs of the world’s leading insurance companies in
2014 endorsing the Principles for Sustainable Insurance (“PSI”), a set of guiding principles
on the role insurance can play to tackle climate change related risk [1].
At present there are few cases [11–13] where there is a clearly demonstrable link between
increased claim sizes and anthropogenic climate change. Therefore there is an opportunity
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to gradually phase in the costs of attribution, by allocating increased costs to climate change
for each claim type when the scientific case is clear. The acceptance of, and agreement about,
what proportion of a claim might be attributed to climate change could involve some form
of international certification or enhanced peer review, for example through the EUCLEIA
EC project. Alternatively the decision could be made directly by insurance companies, in
which case a degree of regulation might be required to ensure that the best and most up-to-
date scientific knowledge is used. The agreed attribution costs could subsequently be used to
define a carbon price. Event attribution presently takes much effort and intense peer-review.
The results are likely to be clearest for temperature-related risks such as heat waves and
flooding, but remain challenging for “singularity” type events whose appearance and impact
are very difficult to predict, such as hurricanes and tornadoes for example. But the picture
is changing as event attribution science progresses, and within ten years we expect to see
widespread availability of near real-time event attribution systems [14].
Ultimately these mechanisms can transfer the climate-change induced insurance costs
to the fossil fuel industry, and subsequently to the consumers of fossil fuels (and chemi-
cals, plastics, etc), with higher total contributions from those who produce the most CO2.
However, to allow carbon emissions to be reduced in a humanitarian way in the long-term,
alternatives to fossil fuels will need to be provided. A price disincentive alone is insufficient
to prevent fossil-fuel use, although it is argued that increased prices have successfully led
to the development of alternative energy sources in the past, by providing an incentive for
innovations and their development [15]. The funds raised from the proposed levy would be
substantial, and there is the option of using them to accelerate the transformation away
from the use of fossil-fuels. If we chose to prioritise the outcome for both present and future
populations, as opposed to solely the best outcome for today, then the optimum course of ac-
tion might include some diversion of funds for mitigation or the development of low-emission
alternatives.
In the decades ahead the effects of climate change are expected to become more pro-
nounced, and even if emissions are reduced their cumulative total will remain a palpable
threat. However, if fossil fuel emissions are successfully reduced then the scheme will de-
mand contributions from a shrinking number of fossil fuel producers. Without the primary
producers to pay the levy, who could, or should, cover the ongoing future climate change
costs? Presuming that we will continue to need abundant energy in the future, and that
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the levy reflects energy production in addition to carbon intensity, then revenues would be
protected in a low- or post-carbon world by an increasingly large proportion being supplied
by non-fossil fuel energy producers. An energy tax or levy would appear to be sufficient
to retain income in the long-term, but why would it be justifiable for the resulting price
increases to be shared by all consumers?
We propose that a levy needs to reflect not just present carbon emissions, but also to
recognise that:
(I) No business or industry is wholly carbon neutral, and either indirectly or directly
produces carbon emissions in their operation. For example, even subsistence farming
today uses tools produced with carbon emissions. Energy use is one simple proxy for
indirect carbon emissions.
(II) Independent of a business or industry’s present energy use and carbon emissions (either
indirect or direct), a levy should recognise that modern civilisations have a fossil-fuel
heritage and a “carbon inheritance” - that is, they are the result of over 250 years of
fossil-fuel driven industrial growth that has provided the innovations and conditions
needed for their existence and functioning - they have inherited the benefits of fossil-
fuels, they should also inherit some of the resulting “carbon debt”.
Acknowledging our fossil-fuel heritage is not about allocating blame (financial or other-
wise) to historic emissions, it is about recognising our carbon inheritance, and paying for the
benefits that it brings. There are many positive outcomes associated with past emissions,
with increased standards of living and improved health-care for example. These benefits
are being felt increasingly widely throughout the developed and developing world, and by
an increasingly large population. However it is necessary to recognise the long period of
fossil-fuel driven research and development that is embodied in every modern technological
product - today’s consumer benefits from past emissions. Those emissions allowed modern
products and technologies to be innovated and developed, and this should (in principle) be
reflected in a small price increase to pay for the climate change costs that we have also
inherited. A financial recognition of modern products’ carbon inheritance at the point of
purchase or use, seems necessary to provide the long-term revenues needed for a successful
response to climate change.
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The costs associated with our carbon inheritance could be determined in a number of
ways, with various degrees of complexity. One approach would be to discern as fairly and
accurately as possible the likely carbon emissions leading to the long-term development and
production of a given product. This seems complex and intractable at present, but one could
imagine scenarios where every product is digitally identified, and all contributions to it can
be identified, traced back, and appropriately priced. Another approach might be to reflect
the time from the industrial revolution’s start to the beginning of a particular industry, or to
the registration of a business. An appealing option is to simply take energy-use as a proxy
for technology use, through a tax or insurance-levy on energy production, and trust that it is
a fair measure for most cases. This would go some way to reflecting our carbon inheritance
and to discourage profligate energy use. It is also comparatively simple, and seems to be
sufficient to ensure a long-term revenue stream to combat the effects of climate change.
Clearly the different options outlined above require further consideration; our primary aim
here is to highlight the ingredients that we regard as necessary and (possibly) sufficient for
a workable financial solution.
Using fossil-fuel is like using cheap credit - it is cheap and easily available, but has
longer-term costs that will be paid sooner or later. Unfortunately the slow natural removal
of excess atmospheric CO2 is causing our “carbon debt” to increase faster than it is repaid
[16]. Therefore a disincentive for carbon emissions also seems to be essential if we wish to
minimise the rate of climate change, and the consequences that accrue from it. In the short
term a tax or levy needs to be weighted so that it is higher for industries with the highest
rate of emissions, to encourage the use and development of lower carbon technologies and
to discourage “embedded carbon”. In the longer term the costs need to smoothly transfer
to low-carbon industries as fossil-fuel industries are replaced. Simple, workable schemes to
achieve both of these aims are not difficult to imagine, one example is in the Appendix. All
of these schemes avoid penalising the development of low-carbon alternatives; only when
they are the dominant producer will they absorb a significant proportion of total climate
change costs. These costs are likely to remain a comparatively small fraction of total energy
cost.
Many of the arguments put forward in this paper can by extension, be adapted to non-
insurance events, that are estimated to contribute three times more loss [16]. This would
take the scheme into the realm of national governments and their disaster relief agencies.
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Another possibility is to acknowledge the contribution to global warming from methane
emissions in the agricultural sector, again through either a carbon tax or insurance-led levy.
In principle we support the intentions of both suggestions, but they add extra complexity
and are a digression from the main topics that we wish to highlight here. We have also
avoided a discussion of the more general impacts of climate change on biodiversity and
wildlife, and have focused on human interests.
Some final remarks on the rationale for, and operation of, an insurance-led scheme. In
principle insurance acts as an individual risk-transfer mechanism, but as noted earlier the
benefits are in practice far broader [3]. Maintaining affordable insurance is in the inter-
est of insurance companies and their customers, as is a world economy that is successfully
adapting to climate change. What we aim to highlight here are the benefits to both the
insurance industry and its customers of offsetting any increases in claims due to climate
change, through either a carbon tax or insurance-led levy on the greatest contributors to
climate change and on the greatest beneficiaries from past carbon emissions. The implemen-
tation of an insurance-led scheme would probably require international co-operation among
insurance companies, but as discussed earlier, the insurance industry is well organised and
could arrange this without the inter-governmental agreements needed for a globally operat-
ing carbon tax and the effective redistribution of its proceeds. Because insurance companies
often serve customers from different geographic areas, an insurance-led levy may need funds
to be centrally collected and then redistributed. In that case it could be argued: Everyone
has benefited from our carbon inheritance, albeit to different degrees, so why not simply
use peoples’ consumption as a proxy for how much they have benefited? Then collect and
redistribute the income centrally as either insurance subsidies, or for e.g. flood defences,
or to help develop alternatives to fossil fuels? There are advantages to this approach [16].
For example, a simpler attribution mechanism may be sufficient to determine the climate
change cost, and some of the transaction costs associated with insurance markets could also
be avoided, albeit replaced by administration costs for the scheme. It would also avoid any
conflicts of interest that may arise between insurers who invest in fossil fuel industries for
example. Clarke [16] develops the case for a carbon tax to raise revenues that are admin-
istered and re-distributed by one or more of the insurance industry, the UN, or the World
Bank. However, this scheme is likely to require a flow of payments from wealthier countries
to those that suffer the worst consequences of climate change. This is fine in principle, but
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will require politicians and electorates agreement, independent of their economic and polic-
ital circumstances. An insurance-led approach has the advantage that it is in the industry’s
interest to successfully mitigate the increased insurance costs due to climate change, and
any flows of capital between companies (to offset insurance costs), can be arranged to avoid
damaging any given company’s profits. As noted earlier, it is presently thought that about
one third of all climate change related losses are insurance related. We would encourage any
scheme that acts to offset the consequences of climate change in an equitable way, especially
one that can continue to operate beyond the fossil-fuel era, possibly through a mechanism
that recognises our carbon inheritance and debt as suggested here.
To summarise, whereas a government-led carbon tax could be used to offset any increases
in insurance premiums that are (shown to be) caused by climate change, the insurance in-
dustry is in a unique position of being able to directly offset any increases in premiums
through increased premiums on fossil-fuel and other energy producers, for example. The
insurance industry is sufficiently large and well organised to be able to internationally im-
plement either scheme. The advantage of an insurance-led levy is that it does not require
negotiations with binding agreements that may be more deterimental to some countries than
others (although negotiations will be required within the insurance industry). There is a
clear economic, scientific, and ethical case for implementing a tax or levy of either type,
and we have attempted to outline some key principles that we think need to be recognised
and incorporated in the formulation of a successful long-term strategy. These include an
acknowledgment that modern industries have inherited the benefits of our fossil-fuel heritage
(our carbon inheritance), and should also share some of the cost associated with those past
emissions. An energy tax or levy offers one simple long-term mechanism that is consistent
with the principles we have outlined here, and can be arranged to ensure the most polluting
industries pay the most, while allowing a smooth transition of costs to low carbon industries
as fossil fuel industries are replaced. The insurance industry is uniquely positioned to lead an
independent or complementary response to climate change, and we encourage organisations
such as The Geneva Association to explore these possibilities.
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Appendix A
The tax or insurance levy could be set uniformly for all energy industries, or determined
by an industry’s rate of carbon emissions, with the largest polluters paying the most. For
example, if ci is the rate of carbon emissions by an industry i, and a determines the carbon
inheritance paid for by all energy producers, then the fraction of climate change cost allo-
cated to an industry could be set as (a+ci)/
∑
i(a+ci), so that the sum over all industries is
1. As fossil fuel industries decline, and the amount of carbon they emit is reduced, then the
denominator (
∑
i(a+ci)) will become smaller, and the proportion of climate change cost paid
for by (low carbon) energy producers will smoothly increase, ensuring a steady long-term
revenue to mitigate climate change. The cost associated with carbon inheritance can be
determined in a number of ways, such as those discussed in the main text, or through simple
considerations such as the past rate of emissions in developed countries. An option is to
increase the proportion paid by fossil fuel producers and use this extra income to offset the
costs of low-carbon industries, possibly to the extent that they represent a positive income.
The intention would be to shift the balance in favour of low-carbon technologies, so as to
accelerate their development.
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